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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970's, a movement was initiated by the family of Karen Ann Quinlan

to recognize that patients and families have a right to decide whether
treatments may be legally and ethically withheld from a person in a permanent
vegetative state.2 This family's legal struggle spawned a new "right," based on
the doctrines of patient autonomy and personal privacy, which has become
known as the "right to die."3 In the early right to die cases, the state4 or

1

The author gained much of his knowledge and experience in medical futility while
working in the law department of University Hospitals of Cleveland. The author would

like to express his deepest gratitude to James J. McMonagle and the other talented
attorneys in the law department for the invaluable instruction, guidance and
opportunities they granted.
2
1n re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, Granger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
3See generally Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 588 (D.R.I. 1988); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center,
229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1978), overruled by In re Spring, 399 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Lane v.
Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S.
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physician/medical facility5 zealously asserted that the withdrawal of life
support systems or the withdrawal of food and hydration from a patient would
be legally, ethically and medically inappropriate. 6 However, when the judiciary
addressed this delicate matter, it examined the important interest in protecting
life and keeping patients alive, and it determined that the right of each person
to control his or her own destiny could override the state's or the physician's
interest in maintaining the external life support mechanisms. 7
Two decades later, the pendulum has swung the other way. Physicians have
acceded to, and now advocate, the withholding or withdrawing of external life
support or food and hydration from patients who are in a prolonged vegetative
state. 8 The justification for this advocacy is that these therapies are futile, and
that the prolonging of the patient's life is nothing more than a prolongation of
the biological organism and not the prolongation of a "life."9 This position is
analogous to the position put forward in QuinlanlO and while ethically and
morally sound, it becomes murky and enigmatic when it is the physician who
wants to terminate the life support and it is the family who wants the life
support to be continued.11 Herein lies the genesis of what has come to be known
as medical futility.
The concept of medical futility presents two major ethical 12 issues that have
tremendous legal ramifications: first, whether a physician may ethically and
legally determine that a certain therapy or intervention is medically futile, and
second, whether the physician may unilaterally or against the wishes of the
patient or family decide to withhold, withdraw or not offer that therapy or
intervention.

858(1981).
4

Gray, 697 F. Supp. 588 (state hospital); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (state facility for

mentally ill); Qinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (cross appeal from declaratory judgment by
Attorney General).
5
Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297; Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d
626 (Mass. 1986); Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134; Lane, 376 N.E.2d 1232;Jobes,529 A.2d 434
(nursing home); Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (nursing home); Storar,420 N.E.2d 64.
6

See cases cited supra note 5.

7

See cases cited supra note 5.

8

American Thoracic Soc'y, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 115

ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 478 (1991) [hereinafter American Thoracic Soc'y].
9

1d.

lOQuinlan,355 A.2d 647.
11In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., 4th Dist. Ct., P. Ct.
Div. July 1, 1991) (unreported opinion).
12

While the issue of medical futility envelops a wide array of issues (including
economic issues of who will pay for futile treatments) this note will focus on the ethical
issues of health care providers unilaterally deciding that certain treatments are futile.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/6

2

1993]

MEDICAL FUTILITY

These ethical/legal quandaries are best exemplified by two paradigms of
medical futility.13 The first is a situation in which a physician wishes to
withdraw a therapy that the physician believes is futile, but her wish goes
against the desires of the family.14 The second situation arises when a physician
determines that cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) would be futile and
wishes to write a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order without obtaining the consent
of or even notifying the family15 or surrogate decisionmaker. 16 In each case,
the physician is disregarding the doctrines of patient autonomy and self
determination and is assuming the role of the decisionmaker. However, this

13

The concept of medical futility has been analyzed in depth with regard to whether
physicians must treat genetically handicapped infants when the treatment will be more
harmful than beneficial or when the infant will die soon, regardless of the treatment. See
Abigail L. Kuzma, Thw Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 IND. L. J. 377 (1983); John M.

Maciejczyk, Withholding Treatment from Defective Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 224 (1983). Some authors have also suggested that the issue of
medical futility may be expanded by the technology used for organ transplants. Robert
D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1560 (1992).
"Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation can replace heart and lung function for up to
several weeks. Physicians now use this intervention when they expect organ systems
eventually to recover or while they await organs for transplantation. However, it could
prolong the life of almost anyone with cardiorespiratory failure, reversible or not. Care
givers do not now offer this therapy to terminally ill patients, presumably because it
would be futile. This judgment has gone largely unchallenged .... Id. at 1561.
14 This type of medical futility issue is exemplified by the case of Helga Wanglie. In
re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283. Mrs. Wanglie was placed on a respirator and, after an
extended period of time, the medical staff at Hennepin County Medical Center declared
that the respirator was a futile therapy. See Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's
Ventilator, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 23. The medical center then
informed the family that they wanted to terminate the respirator, but the family
vehemently refused. Id.
15 Throughout this note, the word family shall be interchanged with the term
"surrogate" or "decisionmaker." This use of the word family is not a judgment that only
families can serve as surrogate decisionmakers, but rather, it is used merely out of
convenience since most surrogate decisionmakers tend to be family members of the
incompetent patient. For the issues of the validity of surrogate decisionmaking and who
should serve as a surrogate decisionmaker, see generally Michelle Yuen, Comment,
Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standardsfor Surrogate Decisionmaking,39 UCLA L. REV.
581 (1992).
16

When a physician believes that cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should not
be used on a certain patient (because of the age of the patient or the advanced stage of
a terminal disease), the physician may write a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order which
indicates to the medical staff that CPR and other life saving procedures should not be
initiated when the patient expires. See AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRq, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265
JAMA 1868 (1991) [hereinafter AMA]. It is generally agreed that family should
participate in decisions regarding the use of resuscitation or the issuance of a DNR order.
Id. However, some physicians have advocated that, as experts in the field of medical
science, physicians can unilaterally determine that CPR is futile and consequently,
physicians need not even offer or discuss CPR as an option to the patient or family. See
Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1281 (1987).
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usurping of the family's decisionmaking ability is precisely what the courts
prohibited in previous right to die cases. 17 If a family has the right to make the
decision to end a loved one's life support, a family should have the same right
to make the decision of whether to continue life support.
This note will provide an analysis of the issue of medical futility and propose
"solutions" to the issue. Part II considers the definition of "medical futility" and
different ways to view the concept. In Part III, the position is forwarded that
medical futility is not actually a medical question, but rather, a question of
values which the medical profession is not necessarily more qualified than a
layperson to answer. In Part IV, medical futility will be examined in the context
of existing law. The Wanglie 8 case, which has generated a great deal of attention
to the issue of medical futility, is discussed. This section also addresses the
potential tort liability of a health care provider who unilaterally takes certain
actions based on the concept of medical futility, as well as the potential
constitutional challenges that may be advanced by a patient or her family. This
section also suggests that the courts should recognize a common law right to
self-determination which would permit patients to continue on life support.
Finally, Part V presents "solutions" to the conundrum of medical futility.
Because of the intricate emotional and value laden issues surrounding medical
futility, it is concluded that the issue of medical futility can best be addressed
and resolved by communication between all the parties involved.
Consequently, each solution is focused on requiring open communication from
the parties. The first solution to medical futility involves the Patient
Self-Determination Act 19 which encourages every person to execute a living
will before she becomes incompetent. The second proposed solution mandates
that the medical community promote a policy of open communication
concerning the futility of certain treatments. This obligation to use open
communication should begin in medical school and should extend to the policy
and procedure manuals of all medical institutions. If the medical community
is unable or unwilling to establish procedures for communication regarding
medical futility, the legislature should establish procedures for handling
medical futility confrontations. This note recommends a statutory framework
to provide the best legislative solution to the issue.
It should be stressed that this note does not encourage the continuation of
life support of a patient who is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state.
Nor does it favor or encourage the administration of CPR on patients who are
terminally ill or extremely elderly. This note does, however, support the
proposition that decisions concerning life support and the use of CPR should
be made by the people who are best able to make these decisions in accordance
with the patient's wishes and beliefs: the patient or family.
17 See cases cited supra note 3.
181n re Helga Wanglie, PX-91-283.
19

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., especially §§ 1395, 1396 (West Supp. 1991)).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/6
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II. WHAT

IS MEDICAL FuTILITY?

"Medical futility refers to a physician's conclusion that a therapy will be of
no value to the patient and should not be prescribed." 20 The medical futility
issue contains two basic inquiries. The first issue is philosophical: whether
physicians, on scientific grounds alone, can determine what treatments are
futile. 21 The second issue is ethical: whether physicians, once they determine
that a treatment is futile, have an obligation to offer that treatment or can
unilaterally withhold or withdraw the treatment. 2 2 In an attempt to analyze
and understand the different facets of medical futility, Dr. Steven Miles
suggests that futility can be divided into four clinical usages. 23
The first clinical usage of medical futility is physiological futility.
Physiological futility has been defined as a treatment that "is clearly futile in
achieving its physiological objective and so offers no physical benefit to the
patient [and consequently] the professional has no obligation to provide it."24
The most basic example of physiological futility is the use of antibiotics for a
viral infection. Since antibiotics destroy only bacteria and do not affect viruses,
the use of an antibiotic for such an infection would provide no physiological
benefit to the patient.25 This note argues that because physiologic futility is
entirely a scientific, medical question, this is the only category of medical
futility that physicians can unilaterally withhold from patients without
violating their duty to those patients. This note will focus on those situations
which have been classified as medical futility but in reality should not be
included under such a label because they are not completely within the
26
expertise of the medical profession.
The second clinical usage of futility concerns those therapies and treatments
that are considered non-beneficial. 2 7 These therapies may provide important
physiologic benefits to keep the human organism alive, but the therapy is
non-beneficial to the patient as a person. 28 A patient in a permanent vegetative

20

Steven H. Miles, Medical Futility 1 (Jan. 11, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Cleveland State Law Review).
21Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The-Problem-Without-a-Nane,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30, 31.
22
23

1d.
See generally Miles, supra note 20.

24

Truog supra note 13, at 1560, 1561.

25

See ERNEST JAWETZ ET AL., REVIEW OF MEDICAL MICROBIOLOGY 157 (1987).

26

Throughout this note the term "medical futility" will carry a legal definition which
refers to a situation in which a health care professional wishes to make a unilateral health
care decision without the consent or against the wishes of the patient or the patient's
surrogate decisionmaker.
27
28

See Miles, supra note 20, at 2.
See AMA, supranote 16.
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state (PVS) who has renal failure will receive physiological benefit from dialysis
treatments. 29 However, these dialysis treatments will be non-beneficial to the
patient as a person since the treatment will serve only to keep the biological
organism alive and not ameliorate the cause of the PVS, nor enable him to
regain consciousness. 30 Included under this argument are therapies that
provide a physiological benefit to the living organism, but cause "vastly
disproportionate iatrogenic harms."3 1 An example of such a therapy is the
rigorous and aggressive treatment of babies who are in constant pain and are
terminally ill.32 In this situation, the treatment itself causes more pain and
33
suffering than benefit.
The third proposed clinical category for medical futility is unlikely therapy.
These "are therapies which are very unlikely to produce a desired physiologic
or personal benefit."34 Unlikely therapies are based on probabilities, and when
the probability of success of the therapy falls below a certain point, physicians
often deem the use of the therapy as futile. 35 An example of such a therapy is
the use of a brain scan to rule out the minuscule chance of brain cancer for a
patient who suffers from tension headaches which subside with rest and stress
management. 36 While unlikely therapies are based on probabilities, Dr. Steven
H. Miles argues that a uniformly accepted "low probability may be objectively
determined," and therefore the decision not to use unlikely therapies is not
37
based on the whim of each physician.
The final proposed clinical category of medical futility is non-validated, but
plausible therapy. Dr. Miles provides an example of an insurer who refused to
pay for a bone marrow transplant to treat a patient who had breast cancer
which had metastasized to the patient's eyes and liver.38 The insurer
considered the operation non-validated even though a clinician estimated that
it might give the patient a 20% chance for years of survival. 39 This
non-validating category of medical futility is based primarily on the financial
considerations of medical futility. If the third-party payor believes thata certain

29

See generally RuTH MEMMLER ET AL., THE HUMAN BODY IN HEALTH & DISEASE 317

(1992); Phyllis S. Dunetz, If Your Med/Surg Patientis on Dialysis, 55 RN 46 (1992).
30
See American Thoracic Soc'y, supra note 8.
31

See Miles, supra note 20, at 2.

32

See generally Kuzma and Maciejczyk, supra note 13.
See Kuzma and Maciejczyk, supranote 13.

33
34

See Miles, supra note 20, at 2.

35

Id.

36
37

38
39

1d.
1d.

Id.
1d.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/6
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therapy is futile or "non-valid," the insurance company will not pay for the
procedure. In this sense, the procedure is not rendered futile by the medical
community, but by the financial community who has decided not to pay for a
procedure with a very low success rate.40
In the four clinical usages of medical futility, there are three categories that
should not be classified as medical futility: non-beneficial, unlikely and
non-validating therapies. The decision to withhold these types of therapies is
a value judgment relating to cost, rather than a physician's value judgment on
the scientific possibility of achieving the patient's goals. Non-beneficial
therapies do provide physiologic benefit to the patient, but these therapies are
too costly or the resources used are too rare to be used in the given situation. 4 1
Unlikely therapies are not medically futile because the therapy may actually
achieve its desired effect (i.e., rule out the possibility that the patient's
headaches are caused by brain cancer). 42 As a medical community and as a
society, we have made a value decision to make certain resource allocations. 43
One value decision that the medical community has made is that it is not worth
the time, expense and inconvenience to order a brain scan for every patient
who has a tiny chance of having brain cancer and whose ailment subsides with
other treatment.
In addition, therapies that are considered medically futile because they are
non-validated are, by their nature, nothing more than economic value
judgments made by the party paying the medical bills.44 These three types of
decisions are not a decisions that fall within the expertise of medical science,
but rather, are cost/benefit value judgments that are being made for purely
financial reasons. While these types of decisions are probably prudent and
economically wise value judgments, they should not be disguised under the
45
over-reaching umbrella of medical futility.

Physiological futility is the only category that may truly be called medically
futile and is the only uniformly agreed upon, value-free understanding of the
concept. 46 Physiological futility is the only category that contains decisions that
are completely within the realm of special knowledge held by medical
professionals. This form of futility does not consider the financial burdens

40

The issue of who pays for medical futility is an important issue but one that is much

too expansive and complex to adequately address in this note. For a brief discussion on
who will pay for medical futility, see Michael A. Rie, The Limits of a Wish, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 24, 26.
41

See Miles, supra note 20.

42

Id.

43

See Truog, supra note 13, at 1562.

44See Rie, supra note 40.
45

Felicia Ackerman, The Significanceofa Wish, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991,

at 28.
46

See Truog, supra note 13, at 1561.
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imposed by or the difficulties of administering the therapy, but rather,
physiological futility rests on the scientific determination that a certain therapy
will be physiologically ineffective. Therapies that are withheld on the grounds
that they are non-beneficial, unlikely or non-validating should not be withheld
under the guise of medical futility; they should be withheld for the proper
reason. 47 Such "assertions of futility may camouflage judgments of
comparative worth that are implicit in debates about the allocations of
resources."48 It should be openly stated that the therapy is being withheld
because of the economic values of society, the medical community, third party
payers or the wishes of the family or patient.
In an attempt to put concrete labels on extremely difficult issues, some
authors have divided medical futility into neat and organized packages that
can easily be placed in a metaphysically 'proper' place on a shelf.49 However,
these labels and categories do little more than wedge the volatile issues of
medical futility into a Procrustean bed. 50 The over-definition of these terms
does not make this problem any easier to address; it only makes the problem
more difficult by obfuscating and camouflaging the issue.51 More emphasis
needs to be placed on addressing the underlying issue and fostering
communication between the doctor and patient, rather than affixing
well-intentioned, but meaningless labels on the issue.
III. Is MEDICAL FUTILITY A MEDICAL QUESTION?
The dilemma of medical futility often raises more questions of values rather
than technical, medical questions. When parties dispute the decision to
maintain a permanently unconscious patient on a respirator, they do not
dispute whether the respirator will prolong the patient's life; they dispute
whether the life is worth prolonging. 52 Such a dispute is not about medical
technology, where doctors can be presumed to have more knowledge than a
layperson. It is about the values of each person individually and the values of
society as a whole. 53 For example, one rationale for declaring that the

47

See Ackerman, supra note 45.

48

See Truog, supra note 13, at 1563.
See Miles, supra note 20. But see Callahan, supranote 21, at 30 (discouraging the use
of labels for the issue of medical futility).
5
OProcrustes was a mythical Greek giant who forced his captives to lie down on one
of his two beds. OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 881 (5th ed. 1970). If the captive was too
tall for the bed, Procrustes chopped off part of the captive until he fit in the bed. Id. If
the captive was too short for the bed, Procrustes stretched the captive until he fit in the
bed. Id. Ironically, Procrustes was killed in the same mannerby Theseus, one of the great
heroes of Greek mythology. Id.
51
See Truog, supra note 13.
49

52

See Ackerman, supra note 45, at 28.

53

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/6
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prolonging of life in an unconscious state is futile is that even if the patient does
recover consciousness, the patient will most likely be severely disabled. 54 Such
an argument is a blatant value judgment about the quality of life.5 5 While it is
within the realm of a physician's expertise to predict that a patient who recovers
from a prolonged unconscious state will be paralyzed or blind, it is not within
the physician's expertise to say scientifically that such an existence is not worth
pursuing.56 Thousands of blind, deaf and paralyzed people find their lives to
be fulfilling and worth living. 57 "It is . . . presumptuous and ethically

inappropriate for doctors to suppose that their professional expertise qualifies
them to know what kind of life is worth prolonging .... "58 There is "a sharp
distinction ... between scientific knowledge on the one hand, and moral and
political judgments on the other; no social 'ought' can be drawn from a
' 59
scientific 'is.'

This distinction between a doctor making a decision based on scientific
knowledge and a doctor making a decision based on her own values is also
evident in a situation in which a physician wishes to write a DNR order without
consultation with the patient or the patient's family. In this situation, the
effectiveness of CPR is often judged on the basis of whether the patient would
survive long enough to be discharged from the healthcare facility.60 Using her
individualized definition of futility, a physician may decide to write a DNR
order for a patient who she thinks will never be discharged. 6 1 "Patients and
families may value additional hours of life differently however."62 For some
patients, surviving in a hospital bed for an additional week, in excruciating
pain, may be tolerable and quite worth the fight.63 This additional week may
give some patients the opportunity to resolve personal conflicts, to partake in
religious ceremonies, to arrange financial dealings, to say good-byes to family

54

1d. (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT (1983)).
55

Id.
Id.

56
57

1d.

58

See Ackerman, supra note 45.

59

See Callahan, supra note 21, at 31.

60

j. Chris Hacker & F. Charles Hiller, Family Consent to Orders Not to Resuscitate:
ReconsideringHospital Policy, 264 JAMA 1281 (1990).
61
1d.
62

See Truog, supra note 13, at 1561.

63

See Stuart J. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2095 (1988).
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and friends, 64 to wait for the arrival of a loved one from another city,65 to see
the birth of a new grandchild, 66 or even cast their vote for the president of the
United States. 67 In this instance, only the patient can decide whether CPR is
futile or whether surviving in a hospital bed, in tremendous pain for a few more
days, would be worth the resuscitation efforts.
Not only are physicians outside the scope of their expertise in determining
if a life is worth prolonging, a physician should also be dissuaded from making
unilateral health care decisions for her patients because physicians have been
proven to be generally poor predictors of the success of therapeutic
interventions. 68 The medical community has been amazed by miraculous
recoveries from "irreversible" vegetative conditions.69 While it is conceeded
that these recoveries are miracles and statistically insignificant, it does raise a
question of how heavily society should rely on statistical cut-offs. While one
physician may determine that a certain treatment is futile if the patient has only
a three percent chance of survival, another practitioner.may believe that the
same treatment is futile if the patient has a five percent chance of survival. 70 In
such a hypothetical, a patient with a four percent chance of success is in a
precarious position. If she chooses the second physician, the treatment will be
deemed futile and will not be offered, but if she chooses the first physician, the
treatment will not be considered futile and may be offered. 71 To protect
against such an anomaly, some physicians suggest that a "treatment should be

64Id.
65

Id.

66

1d.

67

A 74 year old, hospitalized patient told his wife that he wanted to be kept alive
until he could cast his absentee ballot for Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential election.
Vic Gideon, A Candidate to Die For. (WENZ FM 107.9 radio broadcast, Oct. 21, 1992,
Cleveland, Ohio) (transcript on file with the Cleveland State Law Review).
68

Physicians are often highly unreliable in estimating the success of certain therapies
and treatments. See, e.g., Arthur S. Elstein, ClinicalJudgment: PsychologicalResearch and
Medical Practice,194 SCIENCE 696 (1976); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Certainty:Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); Roy M. Poses et al., The
Answer to "What Are My Chances Doctor?" Depends on Whom is Asked: Prognostic
Disagreementand Inaccuracyfor Critically Ill Patients,17 CRITICAL CARE MED. 827 (1989).
69

See Carol DeMare, "Hopeless" HospitalPatient,86, Comes out of Coma, ALBANY TfMES

UNION, April 12, 1989 at A-1. (After the family received a court order to remove the

feeding tubes from a patient who was in a purportedly "irreversible vegetative state"
for five and a half months, the 86 year old patient regained consciousness.); W.F.M. Arts
et al., Unexpected Improvements After Prolonged Posttraumatic Vegetative State, 48 J.
NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & I"-YCHIATRY 1300 (1985) (Doctors were amazed by the

recovery of a patient who was in a vegetative state for over two and a half years.).
70

See Youngner, supra note 63.

71

[d.
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considered futile when 100 consecutive patients do not respond to it."72 The
flaw with this proposal is that it is also necessary to determine how similar the
patients are in age, disease, progression of disease and other types of
complicating medical ailments. 73
While this note advocates that the ultimate decision on a question of futility
should be left to the patient, the volatile issue arises of whether society can force
a physician to provide or continue a therapy that the physician believes to be
morally and ethically repugnant. 74 "[P]hysicians and other care givers have a
legitimate interest in seeing that their knowledge and skill are used wisely and
effectively."75 It would be an anathema to modem society to propose that we
could somehow pressure or force a surgeon to perform operations that the
surgeon believes inappropriate. Not only would such a suggestion border on
involuntary servitude, 76 but the medical community "would certainly suffer a
loss of dignity and a sense of purpose. "77 If society attempted to force a
physician to perform CPR on a patient when the physician believed CPR was
inappropriate or harmful, the health care system would be converted from a
healing and therapeutic system to a battle of rebuffed professionals looking for
respect rather than looking to help and heal society.
In this respect, the courts have held that the right to refuse medical treatment
is not absolute when it impinges on the ethical rights of the medical
community.78 The solution for protecting the ethical rights of the medical
community was to permit the patient to be transferred to another provider who
would follow the patient or family's wishes. 79 In the right to die cases, this was
a viable solution because many health care providers were available who
would follow the dictates of the family and terminate the life support.8 0 In the
case of medical futility, however, it may be more difficult to find a provider

72

See Truog, supranote 13, at 1561 (citing Lawrence J. Schneiderman, MedicalFutility:
Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 949, 949-954 (1990)).
73

1d.

74

The cornerstone case which protects the ethical rights of physicians is Brophy v.

New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,.497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). The court held that a
hospital could refuse to remove a G-tube that provided the food and hydration for a
patient in a persistent vegetative sta te beca use it violated the ethical and moral principles
of the medical staff. Id. However, the court held that the family could transfer the patient
to another provider who would accede to the family's wishes and the hospital could not
impede that move. Id.
75

See Truog, supra note 13, at 1562.

76U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
77

See Truog, supra note 13, at 1562.

78Bropliy, 497 N.E.2d at 625.
79

Id.

80

Id.
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willing to accept a patient. 81 There is a great difference in finding a practitioner
to terminate life support and consequently terminate the physician-patient
relationship, and finding a practitioner who is willing to accept a patient with
a poor prognosis who will take a bed away from another, healthier patient.
Because it may not be possible to find a practitioner who is willing to accept
such a patient, the solution of transferring the patient to another provider is
not the panacea that it was for the right to die cases.
If the patient cannot be transferred, and the physician and the family have
diametrically opposite positions on the treatment decisions, the question of
who should prevail becomes critical. While the ethical integrity of the medical
community is an important interest, this interest should not override the
interest in patient autonomy and self-determination. 82 The courts have held
that while the family is looking for a new practitioner to accept the patient, the
existing practitioner must comply with the family's wishes.83 If no other
physician can be found to accept the patient, one court has held that the
physician must ultimately comply with the wishes of the family. 84
Consequently, when the physician and the family have completely opposite
views on extending treatment, the courts have held that, "as unsettling as it
must be to them, health care professionals must acknowledge [a patient's] right
of self-determination." 85
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY SURROUNDING MEDICAL FUTILITY
A. The Helga Wanglie Story

In the judicial decisions that have dealt with the withdrawal of life support,
no American court has ever specifically decided whether a physician may
unilaterally decide that a certain treatment is futile. The issue of medical futility
is "still in its infancy."86 Although many courts have dealt with the right to die,87
no court has dealt with this unique right to life issue until it was thrust to the

forefront of the medical and legal community's interest in 1990 at a hospital in
Minnesota. 88

81

The Wanglie Family could not find another health care provider to take Mrs.
Wanglie. See Cranford,supra note 14, at 24.
82
Jn reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987).
83

Id. at 451.

84

Gray v. Romeo, 697 F.Supp. 588,590-91 (D.R.I. 1988).
1d. at 591.

85
86

See Callahan, supra note 21, at 34.
See cases cited supra note 3.
88
In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., 4th Dist. Ct., P. Ct.
Div. July 1, 1991) (unreported opinion).
87
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In December of 1989, an eighty-six year old woman named Helga Wanglie
broke her hip. 89 After she was successfully treated at Hennepin County
Medical Center (HCMC) she was discharged to a nursing home. 90
Approximately one month later, Mrs. Wanglie was readmitted to HCMC when
she developed respiratory failure. 91 At this time she was placed on a respirator
and over the next five months, attempts to wean her from the respirator
93
failed. 92 During this time she was conscious and aware of her surroundings.
In May of 1990, she was transferred to another facility that specialized in the
care of respirator dependent patients. 94 While at this facility, she had a
cardiopulmonary arrest, was resuscitated, and was transferred to an acute care
hospital in St. Paul. 95 At this institution, the medical staff discussed the
possibility of limiting further life support treatment, but the family resisted the
suggestion and transferred her back to HCMC where they felt she received
96
excellent care.
After being readmitted to HCMC, she was evaluated and the medical staff
97
suggested the removal of the respirator but the family again rejected the idea.
Mr. Wanglie understood the medical diagnosis and the medical staff's opinion
that his wife would never regain consciousness. When confronted with the
poor prognosis of his wife, Mr. Wanglie replied, "That may be true, but we hope
for the best."98 The family's reluctance to withdraw the life support system was
based on personal and religious grounds. They believed that only God could
take a life and that if the medical staff removed the respirator from Mrs.
Wanglie, the doctors would be playing God. 99
As this dispute began to develop, a HCMC ethics committee addressed the
issue. The initial advisory opinion of the ethics committee was that the hospital
staff should err initially on the side of continuing treatment and follow the

89

See Cranford, supra note 14, at 23.
Since no opinion was authored in the Wanglie case, the only facts that are available
come from reports from those who were involved in the situation. The essential
foundation of facts are illustrated by Ronald E. Cranford of the departmentof neurology
at Hennepin County Medical Center. See id.
91See Cranford, supra note 14, at 23.
90

92

[d.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95d.
96
See Cranford, supra note 14, at 23.
97
98
99

Id.
1d.
1d.
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wishes of the family.1° ° At the same time, the staff should make every
reasonable attempt to resolve conflicts between the family's wishes and the
views of the hospital staff.10 1 Also during this time, extensive efforts were made
by HCMC and the Wanglie family to find another physician or health care
facility that would be willing to take Mrs. Wanglie. However, no other facility
could be found. 102
Finally, the hospital turned to the courts and asked for answers to two
interdependent questions. 103 First, they asked for the appointment of an
independent conservator to decide whether the respirator was beneficial to
Mrs. Wanglie, and second, if the conservator found that the respirator was not
beneficial, whether the hospital had a duty to continue to provide the
respirator.104 Mr. Wanglie cross-filed, requesting to be appointed the
conservator of his wife. 105 After a hearing in the Hennepin County Probate
Court, the judge appointed Mr. Wanglie the conservator of his wife. 106 Three
days after Mr. Wanglie was appointed as conservator, Mrs. Wanglie died of
107
multisystem organ failure.
While the tragic story of Mrs. Wanglie brought medical futility to the
attention of the medical community,1 08 it did not provide much substantive
law or direction on how to legally address the issue of medical futility. The fact
that the Wanglie decision has no written opinion and did not reach the appellate
court level also makes any precedential value gleaned from the case very
weak.109 Therefore, when addressing the legal issues surrounding medical
futility, we must apply existing law to the difficult and unique aspects of this
issue.

lOId.
101d
102

1d.

103

The preceding information concerning tile impetus of the legal battle between the
Wanglie family and the Hennepin County Medical Center is provided by the head of
the Medical Center, Steven H. Miles. See Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for
"Non-Beneficial Treatment", 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 512 (1991). [hereinafter Ifornied
Demand].
104 Id.
105
106

1d.
1d.

107Id.
108See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 45; Callahan, supra note 21; Cranford, supra note 14;
Informed Demand,supra note 104; Rie, supra note 40; Schneiderman, supranote 72; Truog,
supra note 13.
109

In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., 4th Dist. Ct., P. Ct.

Div. July 1,1991) (unreported opinion).
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B. Common Law Tort Liability

Although no legal authority exists on the specific issue of medical futility, a
variety of common law torts could impose liability on a physician who
unilaterally decides a course of treatment or removes a life support system
against the wishes of the patient or family. 110 The focus of this analysis will be
on medical negligence (malpractice), battery, and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
The well-known elements of negligence include the existence of a legal duty
to the person harmed and a breach of that duty by the defendant which causes
damages to the person harmed.111 In a case in which a patient is dependent on
a life support system, the physician would have a duty to act as a reasonable
physician would act when dealing with that patient. 112 If the physician were
to terminate the life support system against the wishes of the family, the family
in the same
would have to convince a jury that a reasonable physician,
113
support.
life
the
terminated
have
not
would
circumstances,
It is quite possible that a plaintiff could convince a jury that a reasonable
physician would not disconnect the life support system of a patient when the
family vehemently objected to such action. If a plaintiff could show that a
reasonable physician would not disconnect the life support of a person under
similar circumstances, the plaintiff would be able to show that the physician
breached his duty to the patient to act with due care, and that breach was the
proximate cause of the patient's death. Furthermore, since the physician
knowingly and willfully terminated the life support, the family could show
114
If the
that the physician acted recklessly rather than merely negligently.
family proved recklessness, the physician might be liable for punitive damages
as well as compensatory damages for wrongful death. 115

110 While this section on tort liability is an integral component of the medical futility
issue, it has been included with great caution and consternation. Our society has
unfortunately become outrageously litigious, and this section of the paper only adds
more fuel to the mighty litigation conflagration that has consumed the American public
and lined the pockets of the contingency fee attorneys. The major premise behind this
section of the paper is to persuade health care providers to communicate and include
patients and families in the decision-making process of health care, not to contribute to
the already overloaded dockets of America's courts. It is hoped that the threat of a tort
suit may persuade the medical community to move away from making unilateral
decisions and move towards discussing procedures with the families and obtaining
informed consent.
11

1See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164 (5th ed.

1984).
112
1d. at 185.
l13ld.
114Id.
115

1d.
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In medical malpractice, the jury must determine whether the physician acted
with the same skill, knowledge and intelligence as a reasonable physician in
similar circumstances. 116 The standard of care question in malpractice involves
a minimum standard of care, below which an individual is not permitted to
fall.117 To show that a physician breached the standard of care, the family would
have to prove that the standard of care in the specific situation would dictate
that life support be continued. Because the question of the standard of care
involves explicitly technical, medical information which is beyond the
competence of a normal jury, expert witnesses are usually used to explain what
the standard of care is in a certain situation.118 The family bringing the action
would have to find physicians to testify that the life support system should
have been continued because of the possibility of the patient regaining
consciousness. On the other hand, the physician who terminated the system
would have to produce experts to show that the therapy was futile and the
standard of care did not require a physician to provide futile treatment. With
the recent push in the medical community to terminate futile treatments,11 9 and
the prevalence of "futility policies" in many medical centers, it might be possible
for a physician to show that the standard of care would be to terminate life
support when it is deemed futile by the physician.
Along with the standard of care, another sub-issue under the rubric of
medical malpractice is the issue of informed consent. "The informed consent
doctrine is based on principles of individual autonomy, and specifically on the
premise that every person has the right to determine what shall be done to his
own body."120 The right to determine what is done to one's body does not
concern whether the decision is prudent, however. "The law protects a person's
right to make his own decision to accept or reject treatment, whether that
decision is wise or unwise." 12 1 The doctrine of informed consent has placed an
affirmative duty on a physician or surgeon to disclose the material risks of a
certain medical or surgical treatment. 122 This has been regarded as a
professional duty, and the failure of a practitioner to obtain the informed
consent of a patient is considered a negligent act and medical malpractice. 123

116

/d.at 185.

117

Id.at 170.

11

8See CHARLES KRAMER & DANIEL KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 100 (5th ed. 1983).

119

See AMA, supra note 16; American Thoracic Soc'y, supra note 8; Blackball, supra
note 16; Rie, supra note 40; Informed Denand, supra note 104.
12 0

See KEETON, supra note 111, at 190.

121Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986) (quoting
Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1231 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978)).
122

See FAY A. RozoVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2d ed. 1990).

123

/d.
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of the practitioner is to disclose
Regardless of what standard is used, 124 the duty
125
all material facts surrounding the procedure.
The issue of informed consent would arise if a physician unilaterally wrote
a DNR order.126 This type of unilateral decisionmaking by the physician would
violate the principles of informed consent because the patient would not have
been informed of all the medical alternatives and would not have consented to
the order to not be resuscitated. 12 7 Even if a majority of the doctors believed
that CPR should not be used in the certain situation, a doctor who did not
inform the patient or family of the issuance of a DNR order could still be held
liable for malpractice. 128 In some jurisdictions, the doctor has a duty to disclose
the risks and benefits of any medical alternatives, "even though the medical
community is divided over the relative benefits." 129 "The patient cannot

exercise her fundamental right of physical self determination when she is kept
in the dark about a medical alternative favored by a significant number of
physicians." 130 If a physician unilaterally decided that CPR were futile, the
failure to obtain informed consent for a DNR order could be a breach of her
professional duty and an invitation to a medical malpractice claim.
In some jurisdictions, in order to prevail on a claim for lack of informed
consent the patient must prove three elements: nondisclosure, causation and
injury.13 1 In the context in which a doctor unilaterally wrote a DNR order, the
family could show that the doctor had not disclosed the issuance of the DNR
order and that the patient had suffered an injury (death). However, proving the
causation element could present a certain dilemma. In this situation, the patient
would not have undergone a procedure, but rather would have had
opportunity for a potentially lifesaving procedure foreclosed. To satisfy the
causation element, the patient's estate might have to prove that the patient
would have survived if the DNR order had not been written. 132 Such a position

124 Although there are no hard and fast rules on what type of information must be
disclosed, two general standards have been developed. See ROZOVSKY, supra note 122,
at 59. The first standard is the medical community standard which dictates that a
physician must disclose to the patient whatever a reasonablepractitioner would disclose
under the same circumstances. Id. The second standard is the patient need standard
which is usually phrased in terms of what a reasonable person in the patient's position
would want to know in order to make an informed decision. Id. at 60.
125

/d.

26

1 See Blackhall, supra note 16.
127

See Rozovsky, supra note 122.

128

Wachter v. United States, 877 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1989) (Murnaghan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
129

1d. at 263.

130

/d.

13 1

Creech v. Roberts, 908 F.2d 75, 82 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Oklahoma law).

13 2 /d.
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might be difficult or impossible to prove since these types of patients are
usually in fragile or unstable medical conditions, and, furthermore, the success
rate of CPR is not very high. 133 Consequently, it might be impossible to prove
that the patient would have lived if CPR had been administered. This
technical/legal roadblock is a harsh obstacle for the family to overcome, and
may be a sinister and even macabre shield behind which doctors may hide.
If the causation element of informed consent or the "battle of the experts"
prevents the family from prevailing in a claim for malpractice, the family might
be able to prevail in battery. In a situation where a physician unilaterally
determined that a life support device was futile and she removed that device
without the consent of the patient or family, the act could be considered a
battery. "[A] patient can sustain a successful claim [for battery] without having
to show that if adequately informed of the risks which led to his injuries, he
would not have consented to the treatment.' 134
As with the informed consent issue, a cause of action for battery would also
present a problem. First, the tort of battery is defined as an intentional infliction
of a harmful or offensive touching.135 In the case of a unilateral DNR order, the
patient would have suffered because the physician did not touch the patient
(i.e., did not perform CPR). Similarly, in the case of a unilateral termination of
life support, the physician might not actually touch the patient. The harm might
be caused by flipping a switch, rather than by actually touching the patient.
However, a battery may be committed by "unpermitted and intentional
contacts with anything .

.

. intimately connected with one's body as to be

universally regarded as part of the person.' 13 6 Under this context, since the life
support machine is the only thing allowing the patient to live, it could be said
that it is so intimately connected with the patient's body as to be regarded as
part of the patient. 13 7 Using this reasoning, a physician could be liable for
battery for unilaterally terminating a life support system. However, it may be
more difficult to allege a battery for the failure to administer CPR.
The second difficulty with alleging battery in this situation is that battery is
said to be a personal tort, or one of personal integrity,and presumably the cause
of action may only be brought by the person who was battered. 138 In the context
of medical futility, the patient who was battered by the doctor would most
likely be killed as a result of the battery. Under the common law tort of battery,
the surviving family would not have a cause of action in battery against the

133

See Blackhall, supra note 16.

134 MacDonald v. United States, 767 F. Supp. 1295, 1312 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
13 5
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1989).
136

1d. at § 18, cmt. p; see also Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.
1967) (plate snatched from a person's hand).
137

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18.

138

1d. at § 900 (1)(a).
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doctor, because it was actually their loved one who was battered and the cause
of action died with the patient. 139
The harsh result of precluding families from pursuing tort claims of their
deceased family member has been abrogated by state legislatures which have
promulgated survival statutes. 140 These statutes generally give the decedent's
estate the cause of action that the decedent would have had if the decedent
were still alive. 14 1 Along with the development of survivorship statutes, many
legislature have enacted wrongful death statutes. 142 "The basic distinction
between a wrongful death statute and a survival statute is that the former
creates a new cause of action for the decedent's death, while the latter merely
saves the decedent's cause of action for injuries. " 143 In the medical futility
context, both survival statutes and wrongful death statutes may extend the
liability for a tort, such as battery, to the family after the patient has died.
When applied to medical futility, even the use of a survivorship statute
presents some problems. Under a survival statute, the decedent's family may
collect damages for the pain that the decedent suffered before dying as a result
of the tort. 14 In the futility context, where a doctor removed the life support
from a patient, the patient may actually survive for a period before expiring,
and the family may be able to collect damages for the suffering that the patient
experienced before passing away.145 A difficulty would arise, however, if the
patient had been in a physical state in which she could not actually feel pain.
If the patient had been in such a state, the physician could have a strong
argument that the family could not maintain a survival action for pain and
suffering of the patient because the patient could not feel any pain. Such an
argument by the physician would depend on the specific situation and would
require expert testimony to determine whether the patient could feel pain or
actually suffered at all before passing away.
Under a wrongful death statute, however, the family would be more
successful in collecting damages from the physician. Generally, with a
wrongful death action, the family may collect for any losses that have
pecuniary value.146 Therefore, in the futility context, the family would merely
need to show what items the decedent provided for the family which they are
139/d.
140

See 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival §§ 51, 113 (1964).

14 1

1d.

142

See James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Recovery, In Action for Benefit of Decedent's
Estate in Jurisdiction Which Has Both Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, of Value of

Earnings Decedent Would Have Made After Death, 76 A.L.R. 3d 125 (1977) (for a general
discussion of jurisdictions with both a survival and wrongful death statute).
143 1d. at 129 (citing 22 AM. JUR. 2d Death § 92 (1964)).
14 4
14

See KEETON, supra note 111, at 942.

5ad.

1461d. It 951.
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now deprived of receiving as the result of the physician's removal of the life
support system. 147 Some interests that have been considered to have pecuniary
value are loss of society, comfort, intercourse, protection and other incidents of
family association. 148 With such a broad range of compensable interests, it is
quite possible that a physician could be held liable under various wrongful
death statutes.
Along with exposing herself to liability under a wrongful death action, a
practitioner who removed life support against the wishes of the family might
also be exposed to liability for the intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress. For the family to prevail in an action for emotional distress,
they would have to prove that the conduct of the doctor was outrageous and
that it caused them severe emotional distress. 149 The RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS indicates that "[1]iability has been found only where the conduct has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."150 In a situation in which a doctor knew
that the family wanted their loved one to be kept alive but nevertheless
terminated the life support, a strong argument could be advanced that this
conduct was beyond the bounds of decency and the actions were atrocious and
utterly intolerable. 15 1 In many cases, a family's request to sustain the life of the
patient is based on the religious belief that only God can take human life. 152
While religious beliefs are not always logical, scientific or rational, these beliefs
must be respected and, as a society, we must be careful not to allow the medical
community to callously violate the sanctity of the beliefs of the patients and
families whom they treat.
It should also be noted that emotional distress is a developing tort that has
not yet established its boundaries. 153 Although the courts have been leery and
cautious of fictitious or trivial claims,

154

the termination of a person's life

support system, against the explicit wishes of the family, is a situation which
should support a cause of action for emotional distress. The law has routinely
provided relief for the negligent mishandling of a corpse without an overt

147

1d.

148

Id. at 952.

149See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.

1501d. at § 46 cmt. d.
151

1d.

152

See Cranford, supra note 14. (The Wanglie family believed that only God could take
a lifeand if the doctors at the Hennepin County Medical Center removed the life support
from Mrs. Wanglie, the family believed that the physicians would be playing God.)
153See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 cmt. b.
154

1d.
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showing of any proof of emotional distress.155 It is only a natural extension of
that policy that families should be able to collect for intentional mishandling,
and killing, of a fragile individual. The likelihood of the family suffering from
emotional distress is not any less when their loved one's body is "mishandled"
by turning off the life support than when a loved one has passed on and the
corpse is mishandled. If the law will provide emotional damages for the
negligent mishandling of a corpse, the law should provide emotional damages
for the intentional mishandling of a live, but frail person. The possibility of
liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is real, and one that
should force doctors to be cautious before making decisions that contradict the
wishes of the family.
The existing tort system can grant damages to a family who is injured by a
physician's actions, but it cannot bring the patient back and it cannot
necessarily prevent the doctor from continuing the policy of making unilateral
decisions for their patients. While existing common law torts, especially
intentional infliction of emotional distress, may impose liability on unilateral
decisions made by the medical profession, the current tort system is inadequate
to resolve the issues that arise from medical futility. Although the family may
be financially compensated, the family of the patient cannot truly be
adequately compensated for the manner in which their loved one died.
Furthermore, the task of trying to calculate damages in such a situation presents
a troublesome problem. Therefore, the law must find other ways to handle the
issues that are generated from the problem of medical futility.
C. ConstitutionalChallenges
While common law tort remedies may not provide an adequate remedy to
the issue of medical futility, the use of constitutional law is much more effective
in preventing physicians from making unilateral health care decisions. The
Supreme Court has found that the right to make medical decisions about one's
own body is analogous to a right to control one's own body, and rises to the
level of a fundamental, constitutional right. 15 6 This recognition of a
fundamental right to self-determination and patient autonomy is not a recent
development in the law. In fact, a little over a century ago, the Supreme Court
indicated that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and

155 See KEETON,

supra note 111, at 63; see also Lott v. State, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Ct. Cl.

1962); cf.Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Civ. Ct. 1976) (Owner

of a pet poodle who had arranged an elaborate funeral for her dog and Was shocked
when she opened the casket and found the remains of a cat, was awarded damages for
mental distress.)

156Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griwsold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
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control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others ....157
The Court has continually affirmed this principle of self-determination and the
right of an individual to decide what should happen to her own body.15 8
Families and surrogates may use the Court's long tradition of supporting the
right of self-determination, the constitutional right to privacy, and the right to
patient autonomy to prevent health care professionals from making unilateral
health care decisions.
In order to assert a constitutional right however, the party bringing the action
must assert that the party depriving them of the right is a state actor.159 In past
right to die cases, plaintiffs have been able to use constitutional doctrines
because the state has been involved in the issue. Many of these cases involved
state hospitals; 160 in some the government became involved as an adverse
party to the case; 161 in others a guardian was appointed by the court;162 and in
others the courts were asked for a declaratory judgment.163 In these cases it
was clear that constitutional doctrines were able to be used because the state
was involved in the proceedings. However, the issue arises whether a patient
may assert a constitutional challenge to the unilateral acts of a physician in a
private hospital where the state is not otherwise involved in the case.
Since public hospitals are not governed directly by the state or federal
government, these hospitals are not automatically state actors. Therefore the
plaintiff would have to show some other reason why the hospital should be
treated as a state actor.164 A private entity may be treated as a state actor if it is
so heavily regulated by the state that "there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. "165 A plaintiff could

157

Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

158Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that a criminal defendant could not
be compelled to submit to surgery); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing
an unmarried couple's right of privacy in decisions concerning contraception); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a woman's fundamental right to choose to have
an abortion).
159Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
16OGray v. Romeo, 697F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417; In re Storar,
420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1981).
1 61
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
162

Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, Granger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
163 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); In re Dinnerstein, 380
N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978), overruled by Inre Spring, 399 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1979); In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1987).
164Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
16SId. at 351.
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argue that, because the health care industry is so heavily regulated by state 166
and federal laws, 167 most major medical centers should be treated as state
actors. Some courts have already accepted the combination of state and federal

regulatory requirements as providing the required nexus between the State and

168
a medical facility in order to treat the medical facility as a state actor.
Once it was established that a hospital could be treated as a state actor, the

family or surrogate of a patient could assert certain constitutional rights to
prohibit a physician from terminating life support. 169 Among the
constitutional rights that might be violated by such a unilateral act is the
patient's right of due process. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution indicate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.170 The surrogate or family could argue that before
the physician could terminate the life support and deprive the patient her life,
there would have to be some due process in the form of a hearing. While it is
not certain what type of hearing would satisfy the due process standards of the
Constitution, it could be argued that nothing less than a full, adverse hearing
would be appropriate when the interest at stake is a human life.17 1 Until this
hearing were arranged, the judiciary would be able to temporarily enjoin any
unilateral decision of the physician to terminate the life support.

166

1n every state, physicians and nurses must be certified and licensed by the state to
practice medicine. The state is also involved when courts become guardians for
incompetent patients or when a patient becomes a ward of the state. Also, many states
require medical facilities to obtain a certificate of need before that facility may make any
addition or expansion to their facility.
16 7

Health care institutions are heavily regulated by federal Medicare laws. See
generally Social Security Act of 1964 (codified as amended in scattered sections in 42
U.S.C.).
168

See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Ross v.
Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Col. 1987); Rasmussen v. Fleming,
741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); cf. Carnes v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1991) (termination
of an employee from a Baptist hospital constituted state action).
169While it could be argued that a private hospital may be considered a state actor in
some circumstances, it is conceded that it may be more difficult to treat a physician as
a state actor, since most physicians are independant contractors and not employed by
hospitals. However, when dealing with the constitutional rights of a patient, the courts
may be willing to treat physicians as ostensible agents of the hospital in order to protect
the constitutional rights of the patient. See Uhr v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 589 N.E.2d 723
(Ill. App.) (holding that the apparent agency doctrine may be applied for medical
malpractice cases), appealgranted, 596 N.E.2d 638 (111. 1992), vacated and appeal dismissed,
614 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. 1993).
170U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
171

The Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), that before benefits are
terminated, a welfare recipient is entitled to a full adverse hearing with an opportunity
to present evidence, cross examine witnesses, obtain legal counsel and have an impartial
decisionmaker state the reasons for the decision. If an individual is entitled to a full
hearing before welfare benefits are terminated, an individual should be entitled to at
least the same due process before a human life may be terminated.
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Along with protecting the patient's constitutional right of due process, the
court must protect the patient's constitutionally protected right of privacy.
Since 1965, when the Supreme Court found that a right to privacy exists in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights, 172 American courts have consistently protected
an individuals' right to self-determination and personal autonomy.173 In
Griswold v. Connecticut,174 the Court held that there are certain decisions that
are in the "realm of family life which the state cannot enter without substantial
justification."'175 No decision is more sacrosanct and private than the decision
to terminate a life, and therefore physicians as state actors should not
constitutionally be permitted to make unilateral value judgments on whether
life support should be terminated or whether CPR should be performed. If the
Supreme Court will protect the right of privacy in seeking contraceptive
advice, 1 76 obtaining an abortion1 77 and maintaining the integrity of the
family,178 the Court should uphold the privacy right of a family to decide
whether their family member should remain on a life support system. Many
of the right to die cases rested on the premise that the individual's right to
terminate life support is rooted in the individual's right to privacy.179 If the
right to terminate one's life support can be encompassed under the right to
privacy, the converse should also be true: the right to privacy should also
permit an individual the choice to remain on life support in an attempt to
recover from the vegetative state.

172 See Griswold
173 See

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (stating that the right to marriage is

fundamental and falls within the right of privacy); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a New York law prohibiting any person but a licensed
pharmacist to distribute contraceptives); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (holding that the traditional concept of "family" is within the right of privacy and
therefore the government cannot define what makes up a family.); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (stating that a woman's right to chose to have an abortion is within her
constitutionally protected right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(protecting the privacy of unmarried persons in seeking information concerning
contraception).
174381 U.S. 479 (1965).
175

1d. at 502 (White, J., concurring).

176

See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.

177

Roe, 410 U.S. 113.

178

See Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374; Moore, 431 U.S. 494; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
See generally Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986);
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In
reDinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978), overruledbyin re Srping, 399 N.E.2d
493 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. Super Ct. 1987); In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647; In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
179

(1981).
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D. Common Law Right of Self-Determination

While a patient has a fundamental right to patient autonomy and
self-determination, courts have held that this right is not absolute.180 The
traditional formula in the right-to-die cases has been to balance the rights of
the self-determination and patient autonomy against four compelling
governmental interests. These interest are: the preservation of life, the
prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties and the integrity
of medical ethics. 18 1 In a medical futility dispute, the first two state interests
fall on the side of the patient. After all, it is the family that is fighting for the
preservation of the life of the patient, which is the greatest of the four
government interests. 182 Since the patient's family is fighting to keep the
patient alive, the second state interest of preventing suicide is not applicable to
the medical futility issue. The third state interest, the protection of innocent
third parties, also falls on the side of the family. The interest of protecting
innocent third parties "is generally limited to situations in which the interests
of the patient's dependent may be adversely affected." 183 In a medical futility
dispute, it is the patient's dependents who wish to keep the patient alive. If the
health care provider were to terminate the patient's life support system, the
state interest in protecting innocent third parties would once again fall on the
side of the family who, as innocent third parties, would be emotionally
devastated by such a unilateral decision.
When balancing the four state interests involved in the termination of life,
the first three state interests clearly fall on the side of a family who wishes to
keep the patient alive. It is debatable however, on which side of the line the
interest in protecting the medical ethics should fall. At first examination, it
could be argued that the interest of protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession falls on the side of the medical community. The health care
profession may argue that there is no ethical duty to provide futile treatment,
and by being forced to provide such treatment, the medical profession is being
undermined and the integrity of health care professionals is being injured. 184
However, a more in depth analysis of the situation reveals that the ethics and
integrity of the medical profession are actually injured by a unilateral decision
made by a physician. After all, "medical ethics incorporates the principle that
the patient, not the healthcare provider, determines what the course of care
should be."185 To permit a physician to make a unilateral health care decision

180Gray v. Romeo, 697 F.Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).

181d. at 588.
18 2

d. at 588; see also Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.

183Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589 (quoting Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602
F.Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985)).
184
See AMA, supra note 16; American Thoracic Soc'y, supra note 8; Rie, supra note 40;
Truog, supra note 13.
185

See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589.
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without consulting the patient or family, or to permit her to make a decision
against their wishes would be self-destructive to the ethics of modem medicine
and a dangerous regression to policy of medical paternalism. The injury to
medical ethics and integrity would be compounded if each individual
practitioner were able to unilaterally act on her own definition of futility. The
fourth state interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession is best protected by letting each patient or surrogate decisionmaker
decide on the course of treatment for the patient.
Even if the courts were to find that the integrity of the medical community
might be injured, this single interest should be overruled by the other three
state interests that fall on the side of patient autonomy and self determination.
The courts have held that the "doctrines of informed consent and the right to
privacy have as their foundations the right to bodily integrity and control of
one's own fate [and] those rights are superior to the [medical] institution'[s]
considerations. " 186 The courts have recognized that the right of patient
autonomy and self-determination may be "unsettling"187 or even
"burdensome, 188 for health care workers, but these rights take precedence over
the wishes of the medical community. When the judiciary is faced with the issue
of medical futility, the analysis of the four compelling state interests
overwhelmingly point in the favor of patient autonomy and
self-determination.
When a case of medical futility is brought before the court, the court should
continue to protect a person's right of self determination and protect the right
of patient autonomy. In order to respond to the situation, the court should
recognize the common law right of self-determination. Because of the previous
judicial precedent of protecting the right of self-determination and the right of
patient autonomy,189 the courts should recognize that a patient or her surrogate
decisionmaker has a right, under common law, to make the ultimate decision
concerning what treatments should or should not be used. The relief granted
by the court could be injunctive in nature and require the medical community

186

Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
1 Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 591
188
1n re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987).
87

189 See generally Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F.Supp. 580 (D.R.I.
1988); Tune v. WalterReed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134
(Mass. App. Ct. 1978), overruled by In re Spring, 399 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979);
Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417;]obes,
529 A.2d 434; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.),
cert. denied, Granger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.
App. Ct. 1981).
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to continue life support systems, or mandate that patients be included in all
decisions made by the medical staff. 19 0
V. SOLUTIONS TO MEDICAL FUTILITY

A. PatientSelf-DeterminationAct
The conundrum of medical futility cannot easily be resolved by using the
common law tort system, and constitutional doctrines may not be a satisfactory
solution because of the question of whether a plaintiff can establish state
action.19 1 Furthermore, the inefficient and laborious court system may not
resolve the issue quickly, placing both the family and the medical center in a
tedious game of wait-and-see. Therefore, the best solution to medical futility is
to have every person, before she becomes incompetent, execute an advanced
192
directive which outlines her choices regarding life sustaining treatment.
Advanced directives may become more prevalent now that the Patient
Self-Determination Act has gone into effect. 193 This statute is the first federal
statute to focus on advanced directives, and it encourages adults to make
decisions about life sustaining treatment. 194 The statute requires medical
institutions 19 5 to provide written information to each individual concerning an

190Naturally, this right would not be absolute, and patients could not assert a right
to physiologically futile treatment. Where a medical determination is completely and
unequivocally within the scientific expertise of the medical profession, the physician
may make a unilateral medical decision. However, if the decision involves value
judgments or, for some other reason, the decision is not completely within the realm of
medical expertise, this common law right of self-determination should be upheld by the

courts.
The right of self-determination is an equitable right and may be limited by a court.
If a patient or surrogate attempts to unconscionably stretch the boundaries of the right
of self-determination in a way that justice and equity would not permit, the court should
not permit such an expansion. Because each case of medical futility is different, it would
be impossible to concretely define the boundaries of the right to self determination.
Therefore, it is up to the wise discretion of the judiciary to determine the boundaries of
the right in each specific situation so that equity, justice and fairness are achieved.
191

See cases cited supra note 189.

192

The term "advanced directive" means a written instruction, such as a living will or
durable power of attorney forhealth care, recognized uider state law (whether statutory
or as recognized by the courts of the State) and relating to the provisions of such care
when the individual is incapacitated. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
193
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., especially §§ 1395,1396 (West Supp. 1991)).
194

See Susan M. Wolf et al., Sources of Concern About the Patient Self-Determination Act,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1666 (1991).
195
The statute requires compliance by Medicare certified hospitals, skilled nursing
facilities, home health agencies and hospice programs. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206.
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individual's rights under state law to make decisions concerning medical care,
her rights to accept or reject medical care, and her right to formulate advanced
directives. 196 Every state and the District of Columbia now have legislation
regarding a patient's right to accept or reject life sustaining treatment and how
to establish a surrogate decisionmaker. 197
196

0mnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206.

197

ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1- 22-8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (Supp.
1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332-353 (Supp. 1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-3201-3210 (1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5501-5502 (Supp. 1989); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-17-201,-20-17-218 (Michie Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1989); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1990); COL.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101- 15-18-113 (1987 & Supp. 1990); COL. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-50115-14-502 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570- 19a-575 (Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (19xx); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421-2430 (Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 21-2201-2213 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-15 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 745.41-.51 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1- 31-32-12 (Michie 1985 &
Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 31-36-13 (Michie Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 327D-1 -27 (Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 237D-2 (Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4501-4509 (1985 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989); ILL.,ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 -16-8-11-22 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 -11 (West
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28.101 -28.109 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625 -632
(Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622 -642 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.970 -.986 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 -.10 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 -714
(West 1990), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 -614 (Supp. 1988); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-601 -603
(1974); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 201D, § (1990); MICH. COMP LAWS §§ 496.1 -.23 (1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 145 B.01; 145 C.01 (West Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 -121
(Supp. 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-151 -183 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010
-.055 (Vernon 1990); MONT. ANN. STAT. §§ 50-9-101 -104, -111, 201, -206 (1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 30-34.01 (Supp. 1993), 20-401 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 -.690
(Michie 1986 & Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 449.800 -.860 (Michie Supp. 1989); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 -H:16 (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8 (West Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 -11 (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501 -502
(Michie Supp. 1989); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-320 -322 (1989), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-8 -14 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-06.4-01 -14 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11 -.17 (Anderson 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3080.1-.4
(West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605 -.650 (1990), OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505-.585 (1990);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5604-5607 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10 -2 (1989); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-77 -160 (Law. Co-op. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-501 -502 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. 59-7-2.5 (Michie 1993); S.D. 34-12D-3 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-11-101 -110 (Supp. 1988), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-101 -214 (Supp. 1990);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 672 (West Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
459oh-1 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 -1118 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467 (Supp. 1988); VA.
CODEANN. §§ 54.1-2981 -2992 (Michie Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9.1 -9.4 (Michie
Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 -.905 (West Supp. 1990); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.94.010 (West Supp. 1989); W.VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 -10 (1985); W.VA.
CODE §§ 16-30a-1 -20 (Supp. 1990); WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 -.15 (West 1989); WYO.
STAT. §§ 35-22-101 -109 (1990); WYO. STAT. §§ 3-5-201 -214 (1991).
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By following the statutory guidelines of each state, it may be possible for
patients to express their wishes with regard to life sustaining treatment. The
Patient Self-Determination Act and the corresponding state statutes are geared
198
toward notifying a patient of his rights to refuse life sustaining treatment.
However, in a case of medical futility, it is the patient (spoken for by the
surrogate or family) who wishes the treatment to continue and the physician
who wishes to terminate the treatment. 199 While these statutes were designed
to allow patients to refuse medical treatment, they may also be used to request
and retain medical treatment. 200 These statutes give patients and their families
the right to decide treatment issues, and these rights include the right to have,
20 1
as well as to refuse, treatment.
The best solution to resolving the medical futility enigma is to do everything
possible to prevent any type of problem from arising in the first place. Every
competent adult should execute a living will as soon as possible, regardless of
whether the person is sick or well. While future incompetence and death may
not be easy topics to address, all adults should accept the realities of the future
and take control of their lives while they are competent. 202 If an individual
absolutely refuses to confront the possibility of future incompetence, then the
203
person should at least execute a durable power of attorney for health care.
By selecting a surrogate decisionmaker, the individual will be able to select
someone who knows and understands the person, and can make an informed
and educated health care decision for that individual. Also, by selecting a
surrogate decisionmaker while she is still competent, the individual gives the
surrogate time to reflect and contemplate her duty. Such a decision will most
likely foster communication between the individual, the surrogate and the
physician, and will generate a better understanding of medical science and of
each person's values. This type of communication and decisionmaking is the
204
only way to truly solve the issue of medical futility.
19 8

See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101 -508, § 4206. See
also state statutes cited supra note 197.
19 9
See In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., 4th Dist. Ct., P.
Ct. Div. July 1, 1991) (unreported opinion).
200
See Wolf, supra note 194, at 1667.
201
d.
20 2

1d.

20 3

See statutes cited supra note 197 for durable power of attorneys for health care.

20 4

The effectiveness of the living will to solve the issue of medical futility depends on
whether health care professionals abide by living wills. One study found that one-third
of the physicians surveyed believed that their training, skill and experience gave them
greater authority than their patients to decide questions about life sustaining treatment.
Kent W. Davidson et al., Physicians' Attitudes on Advanced Directives, 262 JAMA 2415
(1980); see also Wolf, supra note 194.
Other studies showed that physicians were reluctant to follow living wills when
they disagreed with those directives. Joel M. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An
EmpiricalStudy of Physicians' Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REV. 445 (1989).
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B. Communication by the Medical Community

While the Patient Self-Determination Act may provide a solution to some
cases of medical futility, it certainly does not solve all of the potential cases.
Many studies have shown that few Americans have executed advanced
directives.20 5 For those Americans who have not executed a living will or a
durable power of attorney for health care, the potential for a dispute over
medical futility still exists and a solution is still needed to deal with the issue.
However, the solution should protect the doctrines of patient autonomy and
self-determination as well as the integrity and ethical values of the health care
workers who treat these patients.
Perhaps the best way to balance the interests and values of both the patient
and the medical community is to maintain a strong bond of trust between the
patient and physician. This bond of trust must be maintained and
communication is the single most important adhesive in that bond.
In an attempt to establish this trust, Dr. Donald J. Murphy recently tried an
informal assessment of the effects of communication on the issuance of DNR
orders. 206 Dr. Murphy stopped discussing the futility of CPR for the elderly in
vague and imprecise statements. He found that statements like, "Would you
want us to do everything possible to save your life if your heart stops beating?,"
invariably elicited a response of "Why of course, doctor."207 Instead of using
such vague questions, Dr. Murphy "started talking turkey."208 He gave patients
and family members accurate portrayals of the patient's bleak medical
condition and described the harsh realities of dying in a critical care unit of a
hospital. 209 The results of these descriptions were surprising and encouraging.
Twenty-three out of the twenty-four families who were openly informed,
agreed that resuscitation would be futile and consented to the issuance of a
DNR order.210 None of the parties refused to discuss the tough issues because

Some physicians believe that living wills show a lack of confidence in physicians.
Susanna E. Bedell & Thomas L. DelBanco, Choices About CardiopulmonaryResusciation in
the Hospital: When do PhysiciansTalk with Patients?,310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089 (1984); see
also Mamie J. Lerner, State Natural Death Acts: Illusory Protection of Individuals'
LifesustainingTreatment Decisions, 29 HARV. J.ON LEGLS. 175 (1992).
20 5
See Elizabeth R. Gamble et al., Knowledge, Attitudes and Behavior of Elderly Persons
Regarding Living Wills, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 277 (1991); Richard A. Knox,
Americans Favor Mercy Killing, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1991, at 1, 22; John Puma et al.,
Advanced Directive on Admission: Clinical Implications and Analysis of the Patient Self
DeterminationAct of 1990, 266 JAMA 402 (1991).
206DonaldJ. Murphy, Do-Not-ResuscitateOrders:Timefor Reappraisalin Long-Term-Care

Institutions,260 JAMA 2098 (1988).
20 7

1d.

20 8

See Youngner, supra note 63, at 2096.

20 9

Id.

2101d.
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they felt uncomfortable. 211 Dr. Murphy's quasi-experiment illustrates the
importance and the effectiveness of communication in the context of medical
futility.2 12
If a treatment or intervention is presumed by the medical staff to be futile,
the physician should have a legal and ethical duty to explain to the patient or
family why the treatment is considered futile. This is especially true when the
2 13
intervention, such as CPR, is assumed to be provided if cardiac arrest occurs.
This requirement of communication on behalf of the medical profession is not
unreasonable. If the treatment is futile, the physician should simply explain
why it is futile. In the context of CPR, doctors should explain the realities of
CPR. They should explain that CPR was devised to resuscitate an otherwise
healthy individual whose heart stopped because of some other tragedy such
as a near drowning.2 14 They should go on to explain that the effectiveness of
CPR is intricately related to the underlying event or illness that brings about
the cardiac arrest.215 Therefore, CPR will be far less effective for patients who
have disease or other medical conditions that have deteriorated and weakened
216
the patient's body.
When CPR was first described by W.B. Kouwenhoven as "closed-chest
2 17
cardiac massage," the reported long-term success rate was 70 percent.
However, this tremendous success rate has never been duplicated in the last
30 years. 218 In fact, in the 13 papers published since 1960, the rates of survival
2 19
of hospitalized patients past discharge ranged from only 5 to 23 percent.
Physicians should not be timid or afraid of informing patients and families of
these statistics, but should be upfront and honest about the slim advantages
CPR offers in some circumstances. Physicians could even prepare a pamphlet,
ahead of time, covering the "facts" about CPR, and use this in conjunction with
a conversation with the family and patient.
Not only should physicians be honest about the dismal probability of the
success of CPR, physicians should also inform the patient or family about the
211

/d.

2 2

1 Ironically, Dr. Murphy has advocated excluding patients and families from the
decisionmaking process when issuing DNR orders, even after observing such success
with open and honest communication with patients and families. For a criticism of this
view, see Youngner, supra note 63.
213Currently, it is standard practice to attempt CPR on any patient in the hospital who
has cardiac arrest, regardless of the patient's underlying illness. See Blackhall, supra note
16.
2 14

See AMA, supra note 16.

2 15

See Blackhall, supranote 16.

2

6

1 Id.

2 17

W.B. Kouwenhoven et al., Closed Chest CardiacMassage, 173 JAMA 1064 (1960).

2 18

See Blackhall, supra note 16.

2 19

1d. at 1282.
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possible negative consequences of CPR. When CPR is performed on a frail
elderly patient, the chest compressions of CPR will certainly inflict severe
damage to the patient, including crushing the ribs and sternum as well as
puncturing various internal organs. If the patient is successfully resuscitated,
the patient will not only have to deal with the pre-existing illness but also with
the extreme pain and suffering that can result from the damage of CPR. 22 0 The
medical community should not withhold this information from the patient or
family. While it is recognized that such a conversation may be difficult to
conduct, we cannot let awkwardness and aversion to difficult situations
determine how the medical profession operates.
The harsh scientific realities that surround medical futility may be very
difficult to discuss with a patient or family. Along this line, some physicians
assert that the doctrine of informed consent permits a therapeutic exception to
providing certain information if hearing this information may be detrimental
to the patient's health. 22 1 This excuse, however, should not be used by
physicians as a means of avoiding a discussion about the explicit realities of
the success rate of a certain intervention. Furthermore, in many medical futility
situations, the patient is not the person who is making the decisions; it is the
family or some other surrogate decisionmaker who must hear the explicit
details. In this case, the medical community cannot assert the therapeutic
exception found in the doctrine of informed consent, because the patient will
not hear the information and therefore the health of the patient will not be
effected. 222 The medical community should not be permitted to shirk its duty
to communicate with patients simply because the topic of futile treatments and
death are difficult to talk about. Furthermore, physicians should not be
permitted to use the therapeutic exception to informed consent as a shield to
avoid talking about the difficult issue.
While the initial duty to communicate should be placed on the physician,
the actual burden to communicate should be borne by the entire treatment
team. This may include getting assistance from social workers, psychiatrists or
members of the clergy. Every medical institution should establish a
communication policy designed to educate and counsel families who must deal
with decisions concerning the termination of life sustaining treatments. These
communication sessions could inform and educate the decisionmakers on
medical matters, 22 3 while assisting them to deal with the emotional difficulties

220

See generally id. at 1281.

22 1

See Rozovsky, supra note 122, at 59; see also Bradford Wixen, TherapeuticDeception,

13 J. LEGAL MED. 77 (1992) (advancing the position that misinformation can be in the
patient's best interest and actually have beneficial, physiological results).
222
See Rozovsky, supra note 122.

223
The treatment team could explain the harmful consequences of using CPR on the
very elderly and those patients who are in the later stages of terminal diseases. This
communication meeting could also provide decisionmakers with an informal
opportunity to ask questions about patients who are in a vegetative state and find out
if the patient can feel pain. The treatment team can dispel myths and misconceptions,
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of permitting someone they love, to die and the difficulties involved in making
that decision. 224 These communication policy requirements should be enforced
by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 2 25 to
ensure that ethical issues, as well as the patients' rights issues, are dealt with
properly.
If, after the treatment team has met with the family and has exhausted all its
resources, the family still refuses to withdraw life support, this decision must
be respected on the grounds of patient autonomy and self-determination.
While there will inevitably be a small portion of families who will insist on
treatments that are considered futile by physicians, the medical profession
should be able to accept this tiny percentage. 226 If Dr. Murphy's experience is
any indication of the response to open communication however, the
awkwardness and inconvenience of open communication and the tiny
percentage of resources used will be de minimis in comparison to the great
majority of those families who will make an informed consent to an order not
to resuscitate, or make an informed decision to the termination of life support.
C. The Legislative Solution

Although the issue of communication and medical futility is best resolved
within the medical community itself, if the medical community does not accept
this responsibility, then each state legislature should become involved. Even
though every state has some type of statute designed to permit patients to
terminate life support,227 each state legislature can do more. For those people
who have executed a living will or have legally designated a surrogate
decisionmaker, the current state statutes are sufficient. However, for the

and can educate decisionmakers on treatment concepts and theories (e.g., that the
removal of food and hydration for a patient in a permanent vegetative state is no
different than the removal of a medication). See American Thoracic Soc'y, supra note 8.
224
A family member may continue life support treatments because of guilt, fear or
unrealistic hopes. See Blackhall, supra note 16. The treatment team may be able to help
families to resolve their guilt or fear and possibly provide them with more information
so that their hopes may become more realistic. Id.
225
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (J.C.A.H.O.)
is an independent body that develops standards of quality in collaboration with health
care professionals and others and stimulates health care organizations to meet or exceed
the standards through accreditation and the teaching of quality improvement concepts.
JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1992).
226

Although these patients will be occupying intensive care beds which are relatively
scarce, it seems unlikely thatpatients similar to Helga Wanglie will occupy an important
percentage of those beds, let alone a significant proportion of the cost of medical care in
the United States. See Truog, supra note 13.
22 7
See statutes cited supra note 197.
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majority of the people who have not made these important decisions, 228 some
type of statutory guidelines for managing their case are needed.
When formulating such a statutory response to medical futility, it may be
helpful to use as a model, a recently enacted statutory compilation from the
State of New York. 229 This compilation of statutes begins by establishing the
validity of DNR orders when consent is obtained and when a patient's medical
condition warrants such an order.2 30 This section of the statute codifies the
generally accepted notion that physicians may write a DNR order: but more
importantly, this section requires that physicians obtain consent before the
order may be written. 23 1 Every state should follow the New York example by
codifying the right of patients to consent to DNR orders. State statutes should
not stop with DNR orders, however, but should establish a general, qualified
right of patients to autonomy and self determination.
Once the right of self determination is established, a presumption in favor
of resuscitation or the continuation of life support should be created. 232 While
a presumption in favor of resuscitation or the continuation of life support will
err on the side of continuing life, the statute should explicitly state that there is
not a preference towards resuscitation or the continuation of life support. The
statute should make clear that the best alternative is for each person to execute
a living will or legally establish a surrogate decisionmaker. If a patient failed
to execute either document after entering the hospital, this additional state
statute would assure that each patient's rights would be protected. If the patient
were still competent, she could make her own decisions concerning DNR
orders and future life sustaining treatment. However, if the patient were
incompetent and had not executed a living will or durable power of attorney
for health care, the statute should outline a hierarchy of family and friends who
could serve as the surrogate decisionmaker and the order by which these
persons will be chosen. 233 This person would use her best efforts to make the
health care decisions of the incompetent patient based on the patient's wishes,
including the patient's values, religious beliefs and moral beliefs.2 34
The statute should also establish a legal definition of medical futility. The
way in which medical futility is defined is the most important part of the
statute, because it is the nucleus of any decisions made by the surrogate or the
228
229

See sources cited supra note 204.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2979 (McKinney 1992).

2 301d.

at § 2960.

2 31

1d.

2 32

See, e.g., § 2962 ("Every person admitted to a hospital shall be presumed to consent
to the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of cardiac or
respiratory arrest, unless there is a consent to the issuance of an order not to resuscitate
23 3

See, e.g., § 2965.
234Id.
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health care professional. A legal definition of medical futility must be as close
to physiologic futility as possible. 235 The statute should also define other types
of treatments that are not legally futile, but could be terminated by the
surrogate. Under this second category, the use of interventions that would
impose an extraordinary burden on the patient in the light of the patient's
medical condition and the expected outcome of resuscitation for the patient
could also be eliminated. 236 A surrogate could terminate treatment under either
of these two definitions.
Under this statute, if two health care professionals agreed that the treatment
is legally futile and the attending physician wishes to terminate the treatment,
the surrogate decisionmaker should be consulted. The statute should be
prepared for a Helga Wanglie 23 7 situation in which the family refuses to
terminate treatment but the physicians wish to do so. In such a situation, the
facility's treatment team should, in an informal meeting, explain the medical
findings and attempt to educate and counsel the surrogate on the patient's
medical condition. If these informal meetings are unsuccessful in resolving the
conflict, the statute should provide that every facility should establish a dispute
mediation system.23 8
This dispute mediation system should be an informal hearing in front of a
hospital board made up of medical and non-medical personnel. This hearing
would serve the same function that many hospital ethics committees currently
serve: to exchange ideas and opinions on a difficult situation. In this hearing,
the hospital would not be permitted to have legal counsel address the
mediation board, and, while the family could have legal counsel present, their
counsel would also be prohibited from formally addressing the board. The
purpose of the mediation system would be to resolve the dispute, not to have
professional "hired guns" argue each side of the issue.
In the dispute mediation system, the surrogate's decision should stand
unless clear and convincing evidence were produced by the physician that the
surrogate's decision was not in accordance with the patient's wishes and
beliefs, or was clearly not in the best interests of the patient. The purpose of the
dispute mediation system is not to question every decision made by a
surrogate, but rather, to provide a safeguard for the few extreme and
outrageous situations in which the surrogate was clearly not making a decision
in the best interest of the patient. By using the standard of clear and convincing
evidence, the statute would insure that physicians would only bring the most
serious cases before the mediation board. Also, since there would be
presumption that the surrogate was the best person to know what the patient's
235See, e.g., § 2961(12) ("'Medically futile' means that cardiopulmonary resuscitation
will be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or that the patient will
experience repeated arrest ... before death occurs.")
236/d.
237

See Cranford, supra note 14.

238

See, e.g., § 2972.
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beliefs and wishes are and what was in the best interests of the patient, a
physician would have a difficult hurdle in attempting to overrule a surrogate's
decision. This difficult hurdle should ensure that surrogate's decisions were
only questioned when there was a great likelihood that an improper decision
was being made. If the mediation board did overturn the decision of a
surrogate, the surrogate could turn to the courts for judicial review of that
decision.
This suggested legislation would provide a framework for maintaining the
essential principles of patient autonomy and informed consent, while
balancing the ethical rights and principles of the medical profession. While the
legislative framework suggested may appear to be laborious and time
consuming, 239 it must be remembered that the law "recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency."240 Such a decision should not be entrusted to a quick
and efficient procedural process. Perhaps the most important result of this
proposed legislation is that it would demand and compel communication by
both parties. It is hoped that open and unfettered communication would
resolve many of the disputes. It is also hoped that the full procedural process
would be infrequently used and that continued communication would bring
about a solution to the issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems associated with medical futility cannot be easily solved. The
first major difficulty that arises is attempting to define what medical futility
means and within what parameters it exists. True medical futility includes only
those treatments or interventions that are physiologically futile and provide no
physical benefit to the patient. Health care professionals may unilaterally
withhold physiologically futile treatments because such a decision is entirely
within the realm of medical science. In situations in which a therapy or
treatment may have a low probability of success, a health care professional may
not unilaterally decide not to offer that treatment, nor can the professional
withhold or withdraw the treatment under the banner of medical futility.
In a situation in which a health care professional unilaterally decides to
withhold or withdraw a treatment that is not physiologically futile, the
professional may be liable in tort for the injury or death of the patient. To
prevent such an injury from taking place, the patient or her surrogate may
assert various constitutional challenges to the withdrawal of the treatment. The
use of constitutional challenges is the preferred option since this type of action
23 9

1n this type of situation, time and efficiency are not the important factors. Since the
statute would provide a presumption against futility, the interventions (i.e., CPR or
external life support) would continue to be provided by the health care institution. The
only party that might be negatively affected by the delay in a determination would be
the health care professionals who would have the burden of continuing to provide the
interventions until a final determination were made. This burden seems relatively small
in comparison to the dramatic consequences of allowing a life to terminate.
24
0Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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can be asserted before the patient is injured. Finally, if the issue of medical
futility does reach the courts, the judiciary should recognize and defend the
common law right to patient autonomy and self determination. These doctrines
will not permit a physician to make unilateral health care decisions for a
patient.
The best solution for preventing physicians from making decisions for their
patients is for every competent person to execute a living will before the person
becomes ill. If every competent person executed a living will while still healthy,
physicians would not have to guess at what a patient would want, nor would
they have to stretch the definition of medical futility to cover situations that do
not involve physiological futility. The medical community should also
recognize that communication is the only true solution to medical futility.
Beginning in medical school and continuing though private practice, the
medical community should require its professionals to communicate with
patients and families about futile treatments and about treatments that have a
very low probability of success. While communication and advanced directives
are the ideal solution to the problem of medical futility, studies have indicated
that most people have not executed living wills or assigned a surrogate
decisionmaker. Consequently, each state legislature should develop a statutory
framework to protect the rights of those individuals who have not developed
an advance directive. Regardless of what solution is adopted to handle this
difficult issue, the doctrines of patient autonomy and self-determination
should be preserved for the benefit of both patients and the professionals who
treat them.
DANIEL ROBERT MORDARSKI
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